Terrorism's Operational Code

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In 1951 Nathan Leites embarked on an exhaustive examination of what was then commonly seen as the preeminent threat to the international system: the USSR. In particular Leites emphasized the unique role of the Soviet belief system and its influence upon the decision making processes of the Politburo, identifying this belief system as an "operational code" that could

> help "bound" the alternative ways in which the subject may perceive different types of situations and approach the task of making a rational assessment of alternative courses of action. Knowledge of the actor's beliefs helps the investigator to clarify the general criteria, requirements, and norms the subject attempts to meet in assessing opportunities that arise to make desirable gains, in estimating the costs and risks associated with them, and in making utility calculations. (George 1969)

Nearly two decades later his work would be distilled by George (1969) into a series of philosophical and instrumental questions regarding the nature of the international system. These questions provide researchers with a means of generating comparable measures of the belief systems of international actors and have come into prominence within the foreign policy decision making field as a measurement tool for the belief systems of state leaders.

Just as the USSR served in Leites time as a unique challenge to the status quo of the international system so too does modern, non-state terrorism pose a threat to the functioning of today's international system. Hence the application of the approach pioneered by Leites and George would seem a reasonable response in our efforts to understand these new threats. This is the approach taken in this research project: the application of a systematic study of the operational codes of terrorist actors in the hopes of being able to

assist in accurately describing and potentially predicting their actions.[1] This project also seeks to expand

the parameters of operational code research by utilizing it to ask fundamental questions regarding a class

of political actors as yet unexplored by this type of analysis. The internal logic of this inquiry follows

thusly:

1) The decision-making of terrorist organizations should be amenable to the same kinds of
   analysis that inform foreign policy decision making in general.
2) The decision-making process of terrorist organizations is particularly amenable to
   influence by beliefs.
3) The very nature of the organization and its members: its position within international
   society as a result of the type of actions it takes and the peculiar influences induced by
   that position, argue for a coherent group belief system.
4) This belief system can be extracted via operational code analysis such that it can be
   compared across other international actors as well as other terrorist organizations.
5) Comparison of operational codes across actor types (state leaders and terrorist
   organizations), across differing types of terrorist organizations, and across time frames
   for given organizations will yield valuable insight into the behaviors of these actors.

This paper provides an overview of this project to date, with an emphasis on its first three stages and

concludes with an examination of the expected values for the various philosophical and instrumental

elements of a terrorist operational code.[2]

Decision Making of Terrorist Organizations
The study of how terrorists and terrorist groups make decisions and how those processes impact their

behaviors encompasses a wide variety of literature. McCormick (2003) in his excellent review of the

relevant literature identifies three distinct approaches operating at differing levels of analysis: strategic,

organizational, and psychological approaches. Strategic modeling of terrorist decision making employs

the familiar simplification of presuming the actor under study can be treated as a rational unitary actor.

He further identifies two major strands within this approach: the substantive approach that makes no

distinction between objective reality and that of the terrorist world view, and the procedural that argues

that terrorist actors act rationally according to their beliefs about the world system. Under this latter

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[1] Knowledge of an actor's belief system, no matter how important to the decision making process it is, cannot fully describe the
array of intra-group and external influences that might affect terrorist behaviors hence this research is not intended to stand alone
but rather to be used in conjunction with already familiar means of obtaining and analyzing intelligence on these organizations.
[2] An addendum is also provided which indicates the progress of the data collection and operational code extraction processes and
highlights several issues of difficulty.

approach a variety of factors may enter into consideration bounding and constraining the "rationality" of the terrorist organization. While certain of these factors may be externally imposed it is equally reasonable to presume that certain of these constraints, especially those dealing with how information is interpreted may be impacted by factors internal to the terrorist organization.

Organizational modeling of terrorist decision making targets these internal factors treating them either as modifications to the rational process or, in some circumstances overwhelming said process and becoming the determining factor(s) in the decision making process. McCormick identifies several of these as being prominent within the literature including the clandestine nature of the group, the desire to foster a quasi-military image, a bias toward action, competition between organizations, group-think behaviors, and the increased value of inter-personal reward from preservation of the group. Curiously these factors (and others of an intra-group nature) figure prominently in the analyses of both Post and Crenshaw whose works are fundamentally within the psychological and strategic approaches respectfully. Crenshaw portrays the actions of terrorist organizations as rational responses to their internal and external contexts while Post sees the group processes rationalizations for behaviors that individuals are already psychologically motivated to perform.

Psychological modeling of terrorist decision making, as McCormick argues, has generally taken one of four paths. The first is merely one aspect of the much larger body of work on terrorist profiling and concerns itself with the largely fruitless search for a set of psychological traits shared by all terrorists. At its most extreme it has argued that terrorist behaviors can be traced to specific psychological disorders. At its best it has indicated merely that individuals of certain personality types or that share certain psychological motivations may be disproportionately represented within the ranks of terrorist organizations. The second and third lines of analysis indicated by McCormick both rely on the application of broad based psychological theories of motivation (frustration-aggression and narcissism-aggression) to explain terrorist behaviors. In the first instance we have classic relative deprivation

arguments for the turn to violence while in the second this turn is attributable to individual attempts to manage an early and significant injury sustained to one's self-image. The fourth line of inquiry emphasizes the developmental processes that might lead individuals of diverse backgrounds and psychological states to the same path of terrorist action.

As part of his description of the psychological modeling of terrorism McCormick suggests that a unifying theme of these approaches is the importance placed on the belief system of the terrorist. He notes that although there is general disagreement over "how and why this belief system is formed, there is common agreement that it exists." and that it plays a substantial role in the determining the behaviors associated with terrorism. (McCormick 2003) Although he attributes the importance of belief systems to terrorist decision making to the realm of psychological models, in actuality this importance runs through each approach albeit with varying degrees of importance. Strategic models either assume an abstracted belief system that can be generalized across all actors (McCormick's "substantive" approaches) or seek to isolate characteristics of the terrorist belief system that might directly impact rational utility calculations (McCormick's "procedural" approaches).[3] Organizational models emphasize those elements of the belief system that either impact or are impacted by the intra-group processes that are present. In psychological models this emphasis is generally concerned with identification of the belief system and the ways that it impacts the decision making of the individual members of terrorist entities.

Crenshaw (1988, 1990b, 1990c), McCormick (2003), Reich (1990) and others have posed the issue of whether the variety of levels of analysis and types of terrorist modeling might be linked both theoretically and practically. Given the aforementioned prominence of the importance of belief systems within each of literatures on terrorist decision making this would seem a viable avenue to explore in the search for just such linkage. Further, if we are concerned principally with the impact of the belief system on decision making, the application of an approach from the field of foreign policy decision making that has a

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[3] An example of which would be the characterization of a terrorist entity as risk averse or risk acceptant for the purposes of applying prospect theory.

demonstrated capability for the evaluation of belief systems would seem doubly promising. Applying an operational code analysis to terrorist actors is therefore an attempt to leverage an already proven tool for the purpose of expanding its own scope as well as providing meaningful cross level input into our understanding of terrorist decision making processes. However, establishing this approach as a viable method requires meeting two primary criteria: the demonstration of the pivotal role of beliefs to terrorist decision making and the demonstration of a coherence of belief system across the decision-makers of any given terrorist organization. The first, although indicated above, requires elucidation as to how the belief system in the form of the operational code affects the decision making process. The second is a necessary element since operational code research has been applied primarily to single individuals, hence the coherence of a group belief system has not previously been at issue. Given adequate demonstration of these two elements the value of a systematic tool for determining directly comparable belief systems should be obvious.

Terrorist Organizations and Belief Systems
Coherence of the Belief System
The presumption that the decision making apparatus within a terrorist organization shares a particular belief system is based on the following factors:

1) There exists a degree of similarity of motivational factors amongst individual members thus limiting the degree of differentiation expected in individual belief systems.
2) Terrorist organizations exhibit extremely high levels of submergence of individual identity to social identification with the group which, in turn, indicates high levels of ingroup bias which are correlated with conformity to a singular belief system.
3) The nature of engaging in or simply deciding to perform terrorist actions creates a reinforcement of unanimity of beliefs within the organization.
4) Situational dynamics such as the need for security and societal isolation augment pressures for this unanimity of beliefs.

Although there is widespread agreement that there is no single underlying psychological profile of a terrorist and that the motivation for terrorist actions does not lay in some form or forms of abnormal psychology, (Crenshaw 1986, Laqueur 1987, Wilkinson 1997, and particularly, Horgan 2003) there are a number of personality traits that show up frequently and there is some commonality of formative events amongst terrorists. Post (1990) remarks that several authors have indicated that characteristics commonly

shared amongst terrorists include: being "action-oriented, aggressive people who are stimulus-hungry and seek excitement." He further indicates his belief in the prevalence of the psychological mechanisms of externalization and splitting amongst the terrorist population and that this prevalence "contribute[s] significantly to the uniformity of terrorists' rhetorical style and their special psycho-logic."(Post 1990)[4] Post links these psychological mechanisms back to instances of narcissistic injury amongst terrorists and argues that this damage acts as a motivational factor for some. Similar connections have been made back to the frustration-aggression hypothesis and various studies of negative self-id. While these studies have been criticized on the basis of methodological weaknesses (Horgan 2003) and for significant overgeneralization, their persistent theme, that should not be entirely discounted, is that certain psychological traits are found with some frequency amongst the terrorist population.

In addition to shared psychological traits, the presence of motivational commonalities has also been indicated. Silke (2003)[5] notes some of these commonalities including the presence of a degree of societal isolation or marginalization experienced by nearly all terrorists prior to their embarking upon the path of violent action. Whether this marginalization is the result of birth circumstance or social development is largely irrelevant; its importance lies in the presence of a commonality of experience suggesting a limited degree of differentiation of beliefs. Silke also singles out the common presence of vengeance as a motivating factor, arguing that the desire to correct some perceived injustice is extremely widespread within the terrorist population.[6] This desire is generally precipitated by an individual becoming aware of an action, generally one of violence, perceived as unjustly committed against a group or individual with which they closely identify. This awareness may not immediately propel an individual to commit terrorist actions but it could certainly serve as a unifying bond between individuals that have this kind of shared

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[4] Horgan and Silke both take exception to Post's presumption in so far as the evidence for common psychological disorders amongst terrorists is decidedly in favor of the negative – a point indicated by Crenshaw (1981, 1986) in her statements that what characterizes terrorists most is their normality rather than any presence of abnormality. However, the absence of these traits to the degree that they can be characterized as psychological disorders does not devalue the underlying point that certain personality types may be found in sizeable proportions of the terrorist population.

[5] See also Hudson 1999.

[6] See also Schmid and Jongman, 1988, and Crenshaw 1990a: "If a single common emotion drives the individual or group to terrorism, it is vengeance."

experience. Similarly, most terrorist organizations are stringent in terms of whom they accept as members. Extensive background checks, personal assurance from existing members, and various forms of initiation are common. Passing these hurdles presents yet another commonality of experience and although it is not one of motivation it does point to a commonality in the degree of motivation of the individual thus creating not only the presence of experience consistency but also intensity. These commonalities are greatly accentuated by the further isolation from mainstream society that accompanies membership in the organization. Further, this isolation combined with the presence of these common motivational factors amongst certain members of the terrorist organization creates pressures on individuals that do not share these commonalities, such that belief systems that were previously distinct may become subordinated to the more common system(s) as indicated by Sanford (1971): "A stable conscience breaks down if it loses all its external reinforcements, or an individual may adopt a mechanism of defense if this mechanism is widely used by members of a social group to which he belongs." Already marginalized by society and faced with the greater degree of isolation that accompanies membership, new members are likely to be unable to sustain psychological mechanisms that are not shared by the rest of the membership hence whatever independence of belief system that may have existed prior to membership is likely to be assimilated under the greater weight of the commonalities that are present. It should be reiterated that this project in no way argues that all terrorists share these traits and formative experiences, but merely that these commonalities do seem to occur in high proportions amongst terrorists and that this commonality in motivation and experience is likely to limit the degree, at least, to which the belief systems of these individuals will differ from each other. This approach is far different from the oft and justly criticized approaches that seek to argue that these commonalities are somehow responsible for terrorist behaviors.

Further supporting the contention that individual terrorist organizations are likely to have a coherent belief system are the dynamics of social identity theory. Social identity theory holds that an individual's behaviors are, in part, determined by their identification as members of social groupings. An individual's

conception of "self", including elements of their self-worth and notions of appropriate behaviors are inexorably tied to the social groups they are members of and even more strongly to those groups that they identify with.[7] In extreme cases the individual identity may become subordinated to that of the group identity. Both cognitive and motivational elements determine specific ingroup identifications and to some degree the strength of those identifications which can shift as various situational modifiers arise. The strength and persistence of the ingroup identification as well as situational modifiers such as level of competitiveness of the situation exacerbate the potential for and level of ingroup bias that exists. High levels of ingroup identification and extreme ingroup bias are correlated with a lack of individuation of belief systems within a persistent ingroup.

Given that differing social relations are likely to give rise to differing ingroup identifications researchers have examined the role of cognitive salience of an ingroup identification to the social situation. The more pertinent a particular group identification is to a given situation, the better the chance that that particular group will be identified with, if it is one of the individual's possible social identities. (Huddy 2001) Salience has been further determined to promote ingroup bias so it acts both as trigger and accentuator. While much of the social identity research points to the transitive nature of one's identity it seems reasonable to presume that under nearly all conditions where political belief structures are activated, the salience of an individual's identity as a member of a terrorist organization is likely to be high. Thus under those conditions where political beliefs matter, individuals are most likely to use their terrorist organization as their identified ingroup. In turn this is likely to produce ingroup bias that will generate coherence of belief systems within the group. The salience of the group identity is further indicated by the presence of high levels of competition between groups. (Huddy 2001) There can be little doubt that the relationship of the terrorist organization to other outgroups, specifically the legal authorities and the larger disapproving society, is one of extreme competitiveness, with the freedom and lives of the terrorist

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[7] Creating what is termed "intergroup behavior" as defined by Henri Tajfel and John C. Turner, (1986): "any behavior displayed by one or more actors toward one or more others that is based on the actors' identification of themselves and the others as belonging to different social categories."

organization members at stake. What may be less obvious is that each terrorist organization is also engaged in a form of competition with other such groups for the attention of their target audiences (McCormick 2003)

The tendency to submerge one's individual identity into a greater group identity is a persistent theme across terrorism experts of all types.[8] Evidence for the presence of strong ingroup/outgroup distinctions can be seen in a number of intra-group characteristics associated with terrorist organizations including the fostering of an idealized view of the organization (Crayton 1983), the portrayal of its membership as a distinctive elite (Leites 1979, Hoffman 1998, McCormick 2003), the presence of strict controls on individual behaviors (Crenshaw 1986, Post 1990), the existence of high cost initiation rites (Crenshaw 1988), and the suppression of dissent (Crenshaw 1986, Post 1990, et al). Perhaps most telling in this regard is the intolerance for dissent that is exhibited amongst these organizations. Effective dissent has generally resulted in either elimination of the dissenting party(ies) or (more rarely) schism within the organization. Hence even in situations where differing belief systems are present, those holding them are likely to engage in behaviors of self-suppression lest they be forcibly excluded from the organization, often in particularly brutal fashion.

Further, the everyday demands of membership in a terrorist organization are likely to make this their dominant social identity – one that is active under the majority of an individuals social interactions particularly those interactions that involve estimations regarding the political universe. The need for secrecy is high with terrorist organizations and so the mental distinction between ingroup and outgroup must be maintained at all times. Regardless of the social situation, the terrorist must be on guard, cognizant that the demands of secrecy require care in one's social interactions. Opportunities for social mobility, the shifting of identification from one group to another, are minimized by isolation of the terrorist group from the larger portion of society as well as the generally harsh costs associated with a

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[8] Crenshaw 1986, Post 1990, Sprinzak 1990 amongst many others.

shift in identification away from a group that demands high levels of commitment and loyalty. Ingroup

identification has also been associated with conditions where the identification is considered voluntary, as

opposed to an arbitrary or imposed categorization. To the extent then that an individual believes that they

have made a choice to belong to this organization or that they have played a role in the radicalization of

their organization, their self identification with the group is likely to be enhanced. For these reasons, the

members of terrorist organizations are likely to have extremely strong social identities that are dominated

by their singular identification with the terrorist organization.[9]

The nature of the actions undertaken by terrorists further isolates them from other social identities. The

shared actions for which there can be very little empathy from outgroups create a pressure to maintain the

ingroup identification with the terrorist organization. Terrorist actions are, by their very definition,

violent in character and generally presumed to be considered illegitimate expressions of violence amongst

significant portions of the population. Even in areas in which there is widespread support for the causes

of the terrorist organization there is often significant resistance to the use of terrorist methods (Crenshaw

1988). The commonality of having engaged in these actions and the perceived isolation that accompanies

that commonality reinforces loyalty across the membership which, in turn, affects the coherence of the

group's belief system: "the stronger the loyalty the more likely members of a group are to hold similar

views and endorse similar strategies." (Druckman 1994)[10]

The limited differentiation of initial beliefs as indicated by commonalities in experience and motivation,

the subordination of individual identity to that of the group, situational characteristics such as the need for

secrecy and the degree of societal isolation, and the violent nature of the terrorist actions themselves all

point to the presence of a singular belief structure within the decision making apparatus of terrorist

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[9] Note that a contrary opinion could be expressed based on the self identification of terrorists wih the "cause" not the group. I would contend however that this is a potential indicator of an attempt to rationalize ingroup divisions and may actually be indicative of the potential for schism within the terrorist organization.

[10] This differs from the earlier stated point that commonality of experience is likely to limit the degree of differentiation of belief as well as the persistence of such differentiation across the membership in that here it is the loyalty to the group and to its members, born out of a need to protect the group and safeguard its members and cause that promotes the contention of a coherent belief structure.

organizations. It should be pointed out that this merely indicates that any given terrorist organization will have a singular belief system. While this is important for the application of the operational code technique it does not address the issue of whether there is a single belief system that can be said to characterize all terrorist organizations. However the presence of a single belief system for a given terrorist entity will directly impact on the process of decision making as explored below.

Importance of Belief Systems to Decision-Making
Within the foreign policy decision making field the importance of beliefs as an influence upon decision making is highly prevalent with a number of differing approaches being utilized to examine these beliefs and their impacts.[11] While any number of these approaches are potentially viable vectors for the exploration of the impact of beliefs on terrorist decision making several seem of particular applicability. As indicated previously the importance of beliefs to the behavioral prescriptions of terrorist organizations is widely accepted amongst theorists despite a general lack of agreement on the exact mechanisms for this effect. Holsti (1982) indicates that "evidence would certainly appear to suggest that situations characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, surprise, information overload, high stress, and the like are among those most likely to bring into play the beliefs of top ranking political leaders." It is no great stretch to see that each of these factors is likely to be relevant to the decision making of the terrorist group thus exacerbating the role of beliefs in this process. Likewise high levels of ingroup bias are directly correlated with the presence of "demonizing" behaviors toward outgroups, an accentuation of the fundamental attribution error, and a general simplification of the image of the other as opposed to self. These are indicators of decision making that is reliant upon imaging which in turn draws both its cognitive and motivational justifications from the actor's beliefs. Additionally certain specific beliefs are known to be prevalent amongst terrorist entities and these beliefs have been linked to particular behavioral patterns. Beliefs in the inevitability of their success, the efficacy of violent tactics, and a need for action rather than dialogue and negotiation have been noted as being of special importance to the

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[11] Note previous operational code examinations of state leaders, the conceptual complexity work of M.G. Hermann (1977 et al), leader image theory (Blanton 1996), Cottam's work on cognitive influences (1986), exploration of the role of ideological beliefs (Carlsnaes 1986) as well as many others for examples of studies on belief impact.

decision making and planning of terrorists (Crenshaw 1986, 1990b, Hoffman 2002, Laqueur 1987, 2003 and others). Perhaps the most obvious of linkages between beliefs and decision making relies upon the groupthink literature originated by Janis (1972). Coherent belief systems combined with pressures toward conformity and suppression of dissent all point to the presence of groupthink conditions under which there is likely to be minimal questioning of the basic beliefs of the decision making entity (Crenshaw 1986, Post 1990) as well as a shift toward the acceptance of extremist behavioral options (Hermann 1979). Given that each of these belief arisen effects (as well as potentially numerous others) impact the results of terrorist group decision making there exists the clear potential for a measure of a terrorist entity's belief system to enlighten our understanding of the behaviors of terrorist organizations.

Operational Code as a Belief System Measure
As noted in the introduction the concept of the operational code has its origin with Leites' work on the Soviet Politburo. As originally formulated (Leites 1951, 1953), the operational code concept was intended as a measurement of the psychological impacts upon foreign policy decision-making, as influenced by the effects of culture, ideology, and personality type. George (1969) recast this analysis in the form of persistent, underlying philosophical and instrumental beliefs that impact the decision-making process through their effects on cognition. George's conceptualization relied upon a series of belief questions relating to the perceived state of the world, the role of the individual within that world, and attitudes toward the efficacy of various instrumental means. Holsti (1977) built upon this framework to create a typology of belief systems that, in turn, would reflect patterns of a given leader's decision-making. The operating presumptions regarding these belief systems included internal consistency, persistence over time, and independence of issue-area. As noted in Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998), these presumptions were only inconsistently upheld by subsequent research on a variety of leaders. Largely as a result of these findings Walker (1983) reconceptualized the operational code as a series of self-attributions reflecting alternate "states of mind" of the leader. This perspective allowed for internal inconsistency, shifts in beliefs over time (learning), as well as the application of differing belief structures to distinct issue areas. However, still key to Walker's work is the presumption of a kind of baseline belief

structure (what Walker refers to as "default" state of mind) that represents a leader's proclivities absent

some form of priming stimulus. Most recently Walker and Schafer have further nuanced the operational

code scheme through recognition that leaders' self- and other-attributions are likely differenced and that

accounting for the combination of self- and other-attributions allows for the defining of preference

orderings for strategic options through a more refined typology (Walker and Schafer 2000a, 2000b).[12]

Although most often applied to state leaders as individuals, Walker and Schafer (2000a) have argued that

"As individuals have operational codes, so do states and other collectivities" and that one can arrive at the

operational codes for states through examination of the "public beliefs and intentions articulated by the

official leader(s) of the state".[13] One of the tasks of this research is to build upon this presumption to

demonstrate an application of the operational code approach to a collective other than a state and it is

hoped that the preceding commentary on the presence of a coherent belief system and the role of beliefs

within the decision making process of terrorist entities has provided something of a foundation for this

application.

Why The Operational Code Approach?
Silke (2003) notes that some 80% of the current research on terrorism is reinterpretation of existing

material and indicates that there is a need for the generation of new data. This point is echoed by Hudson

(1999) whom notes the non-existence of large-scale data sets that would permit cross-comparison of

psychological and sociological data on terrorism. An important element of this research project then is

the origination of just such a data collection effort centered on the creation of identifiable and comparable

operational codes for several modern terrorist organizations. Obviously it is hoped that this will be the

genesis of further work that will extend this collection and provide ever-greater dividends to the study of

terrorist behaviors. One may well question however the use of the operational code approach and not

some other for the generation of this data. Several advantages should be readily apparent. A substantial

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[12] Given the extreme ingroup/outgroup differentiation discussed previously this reliance of the operational code upon self and other prescriptions would appear to be directly applicable.
[13] It is worthwhile to note that the original formation of the operational code under Leites was directed not at a single leader but at the Soviet politburo.

difficulty with data collection of this sort is the nature of the entities under study. The operational code approach is an at-a-distance measure relying as it does upon the content analysis of public statements. This neatly sidesteps the difficulty of attempting to garner information on the basic belief structures of clandestine organizations that regularly resort to violence in order to protect their secrecy. While both Silke (2003) and Horgan (2003) as well others have taken issue with the use of at-a-distance measures for studying the psychological processes of individual terrorists, these criticisms are leveled at attempts to conduct psychological profiling and the diagnosis of psycho-pathologies rather than the construction of general patterns of beliefs about the political system. Further, in making use of public statements issued by terrorist leadership and spokespersons the operational code approach makes use of a rarely utilized source of terrorist information. Rapoport (1988) noted that he was aware of only two studies at the time that were "based wholly on written materials by terrorists". The other studies being Leites "Understanding the Next Act" (1979) and Cordes "When Terrorists Do the Talking: Reflections on Terrorist Literature" (1988). Currently the field remains largely bereft of work that makes use of this potentially valuable resource. This is as unfortunate as it is surprising given the substantially greater access to statements of this kind that has been afforded by the rapid expansion of internet sources for this information. Additional leverage is gained by utilizing the operational code approach since, in its current form, it makes use of machine coding via the Verbs In Context System (VICS).[14] This allows for the creation of data which is, to a high degree, replicable and strictly comparable across other operational code analyses.

A potential methodological issue does arise in relying upon the public statements of these entities however. Walker and Schafer have found reason to suspect that the private operational code of a state leader may differ in important ways from the public operational code of the state (Walker and Schafer

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[14] There does exist an issue with presuming we can measure op code via language structure when we are dealing with sources from multiple individuals – even if they share the same operational code will it be apparent in their linguistic styles. This is at the heart of the VICS process. If it truly does measure the operational code and there is a coherent operational code amongst the authors then we would expect to see similar results from the VICS coding regardless of the number of sources of that code.

2000a). It is worth noting that while several authors (Marfleet 2000, Schafer 2000, Walker 2000, Walker & Schafer 2000a), have noted differences between private and public operational codes none claim greater predictive strength for one over the other. Marfleet (2000) specifically notes that while the absolute scores of both may differ they generally follow the same trend (albeit to greater and lesser degrees) thus indicating that as predictive variables either may be appropriate. Given the difficulties in obtaining evidence of the private operational codes for terrorist leadership, there is little that can be done in the way of comparison of these values but also little reason to suspect that the differences would significantly impact this study's results.

More problematic are the differences between prepared and spontaneous materials and the biases engendered by either type. The use of prepared material has been particularly singled out as a biasing source, lending itself easily to the "context effect" in which an appeal is crafted to the audience of the text thereby influencing its content and thereby the measures derived from it (Schafer 2000, Walker 2000, Walker & Schafer 2000a). This issue is actually of lesser concern when dealing with this class of sub-state actor. Two ameliorating factors stand out. The first is the degree to which the message is crafted. The second is the nature of that crafting. While there is no doubt that publicly released messages from terrorist organizations are generally crafted pieces, the extent to which they can deviate from expressing the true belief system of the organization is minimal. Crenshaw (1986) notes that both leaders and followers within such organizations are "under great pressure to conform to group norms, making innovation or compromise difficult...In effect, the behavior of both leaders and followers is restricted by the terrorist group." The pressure of maintaining a consistent belief system within the group and the lack of external sources of influence ensure, in effect, that publicly released statements are accurate reflections of the group's belief system; to be otherwise would be to compromise the goals of the organization. Further, the nature of the organization does not lend itself toward masking its beliefs in word choices designed to elicit acceptance. Public expression of the belief system, accepted or not, is the goal and as such the "context effect" is minimized. An alternate conceptualization is that whatever "context effect" is

introduced is done so as an accurate expression of the belief system. The "biasing" is less an artifact of the text than an accurate statement of the extreme nature of the views presented. In each instance therefore the nature of the actor being studied tends to limit the detrimental effects of the nature of the gathered data.

The Operational Code of Terrorist Organizations
Before examining the expectations for the individual philosophical and instrumental elements of the operational code of terrorist organizations it is worthwhile to indicate some general research questions that can reasonably be explored by doing so. Several such questions are readily apparent including whether we can distinguish terrorist organizations, on the basis of their beliefs, from other actors within the system; can we identify a particular belief system as indicative of terrorist organizations; and whether we can distinguish such organizations from each other on the basis of their belief systems.

Given the copious amount of material devoted to how (and whether) terrorism and terrorist groups can be defined it is not a trivial undertaking to assert that one may reasonably identify terrorist organizations from other interstate actors based upon their belief system. In order for this to be supported there must be characteristics of the operational codes of the terrorist groups under consideration that are statistically distinguishable from the values obtained from some form of control group. In this instance the available control group consists of the already well developed operational codes of state leaders.[15] The philosophical and instrumental indexes originally noted in George and as defined by Walker and Schafer (1986) for the VICS coding system, can be utilized to indicate characteristics likely to differ from those of state leaders.

Related to this first question is the issue of whether or not terrorist organizations share a particular operational code. This more directly addresses the issue of using the operational code as a definitional

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[15] The presence of distinguishable characteristics would not necessarily constitute evidence that terrorist organizations can be distinguished on the basis of their beliefs, merely that they can be distinguished from the belief systems of state leaders. Still, this would provide a preliminary but substantive indicator that we might be able to define terrorist organizations not just on the basis of the actions committed but on the basis of their motives for doing so.

tool for differentiating terrorist organizations from other types of actors. In order for this to be supported not only must there be characteristics of the operational codes of the terrorist groups under consideration that are statistically distinguishable from the values obtained from state leaders, the varying characteristics must be the same across each terrorist organization and must also vary to similar degrees.

A third question to be explored is the issue of whether terrorist organizations can be distinguished from one another on the basis of differences in their belief systems. Even if there exists an operational code distinctive to terrorist actors we might reasonably presume that there will be some degree of differentiation within those codes. By noting regularities across those terrorist groups that share particular characteristics such as: ideology, structure, target and/or method choice, as well as differences between those groups that do not share similar characteristics one might very well be able to distinguish different types of terrorist organizations. The policy implications of such differentiation are significant in that counter-terrorist strategies may currently differ depending on directly observable information such as the religious nature of the group, its size, preferred targets, location, level of state-sponsorship etc. there has been little, if any, attention paid to the importance of varying counter-terrorist strategies based upon the belief structure of these organizations. If, for example, a particular terrorist organization has a notably higher level of shift propensity between words and deeds this might indicate a different counter-terrorist strategy than if said group had an extremely low shift propensity in this area. Essentially then this project has the potential for the development of more effective counter-terrorist strategies by exploiting information that can be gained regarding their fundamental beliefs about the international system through at-a-distance measures.

The following presents the component philosophical and instrumental questions that make up the operational code, the VICS measure for that index, as well as the base assumptions regarding those beliefs that can be generalized from the current literature on terrorist organizations.

Philosophical Beliefs
P-1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

Index: % Positive minus % Negative Transitive Other Attributions
(+1= friendly to –1=hostile)

> The key assumption here is that beliefs about how others approach and pursue their goals in the political universe define the nature of politics, political conflict, and the image of the opponent for the leader. That is, the more cooperative the leader's diagnosis of the nature of the political universe, the higher the net frequency of cooperative attributions to others in the political universe. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

Given that terrorism is a strategic choice born out of a lack of the resources necessary to match one's political opponents we can safely assume that the terrorist perception of political opponents is colored by this asymmetry. Opponents are capable of wielding extensive power at all levels of the political spectrum against the organization and in most instances refuse negotiation in favor of violent response thus indicating the conflictual nature of the universe. The rhetorical flourishes of the calls for no negotiation on the part of the terrorist organization's opponents only serve to amplify this presumption that one's opponents are imminently hostile to the goals of the organization and prefer conflictual strategies. Further, the international climate, in general, has been hostile toward groups that have undertaken terrorist actions thus the "essential" nature of political life is likely to be one of continual conflict with a strong, capable and nearly omnipresent enemy. These effects may be mollified to some extent in situations where the terrorists are known to experience high levels of popular support. Although as Rapoport makes clear even in these instances there are likely to be competing constituencies of any given terrorist organization (Rapoport 1988) thus indicating an indeterminate effect on their belief in the hostility of the international scene.

The counter hypothesis that terrorist organizations will see the world as one that is inherently cooperative and non-conflictual finds little to support it. At face value it would seem hard to reconcile a belief in the world as a genuinely cooperative environment, populated by others willing to cooperate, with a need to resort to violence to achieve one's goals. As indicated above there may be some modification of the extent to which the world is conflictual based largely upon access to a supportive population or outside

support such as by a state or states, however these may reasonably be presumed to be in the form of

incremental changes in the basic belief of these organizations. Hence we should expect scores on this

index to be significantly lower than the mean for state leaders and to approach –1 in value.

P-2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score; and in what respects the one and/or the other?

Index: Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3
(+1 optimistic to –1 pessimistic)

> Holsti also distinguishes optimistic from pessimistic leaders regarding the prospects for
> achieving one's fundamental political values on the basis of their belief that conflict is
> either temporary or permanent in the political universe. We assume that the more
> optimistic the leader's diagnosis for realizing one's political values, the less negative and
> more positive the net intensity of attributions to others in the political universe. (Walker,
> Schafer and Young 1998)

Unfortunately the basic assumption inherent in this measure is somewhat flawed, resting as it does on the

presumption that the prospects for achieving one's political goals are dependent upon the intensity and/or

persistence of conflict in the international system. Achievement of one's political aims may be possible

regardless of the intensity or persistence of conflict in the system. In fact, one might very well argue that

there are certain classes of international actors that would see an intensely conflictual system as being of

assistance in the achievement of their aims. For this reason this index is better interpreted as a measure of

the intensity of the cooperation/conflict balance within the system rather than as a measure of optimism or

pessimism of the subject. A better indicator of the latter is the P-4 measure discussed below. While this

alteration does make strict comparison of the P-2 measure to early operational code studies[16] untenable,

comparison of this index to those studies that utilize the VICS method is still viable, bearing in mind that

these previous studies should be reinterpreted in the context of the altered conceptualization.

Ingroup pressures are likely to accentuate the perception of an intensely violent system by playing up the

competition between the terrorist ingroup and the greater world as the outgroup. The bias thus generated

often takes the form of "demonization" of the outgroup further indicating that the terrorist group is likely

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[16] Those that did not rely upon the VICS coding scheme.

to attribute highly conflictual behaviors to the outgroup or, in this case, all others. This "demonization" is likely to be reinforced by the rigid interpretations of the information sources available to the members of the organization: "The group filters all news of external events that reaches its members, putting an interpretation on such events that emphasizes the evils of the enemy." (Cameron 1997) Note also the previously indicated commonality, that in many cases, individual terrorists have reported undertaking terrorist actions only after seeing highly violent actions taken against the people they represent or are part of. This would indicate again the prevalence of the belief that the international system is inherently and intensely violent and that one's opponents are particularly so (Silke 2003).

An alternative hypothesis is possible that would limit the intensity of negative references if the denigration of the enemy takes the form of portraying said other as lazy, weak, and generally incapable of countering terrorist actions with force. Here we might call to mind the image of the US operation in Somalia that was portrayed in Bin Laden's 1996 Fatwa as one of a state lacking the will to engage in action:

> after vigorous propaganda about the power of the USA…you moved tens of thousands of international force, including twenty eight thousand American solders into Somalia. However, when tens of your solders were killed in minor battles and one American Pilot was dragged in the streets of Mogadishu you left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat and your dead with you. Clinton appeared in front of the whole world threatening and promising revenge , but these threats were merely a preparation for withdrawal…the extent of your impotence and weaknesses became very clear. (Bin Laden 1996)

The portrayal of others in such a manner would be indicative of a lowered intensity of conflict expected in the system however, as with the counter hypothesis for P-1 this is likely to be a matter of degree and may therefore be of use as an indicator of differentiation between terrorist organizations but not of sufficient magnitude to alter the basic differentiation from state leaders.

Based on a similar logic to that presented for the expectation of P-1 the expectation for P-2 is that it will be of a strongly negative value. Not only would we expect there to be fewer instances of cooperative other references but we can expect that conflictual other references will be weighted toward threats and

punishments rather than simple opposition or resistance. Again therefore we would expect the value for this index to be significantly lower than the mean for state leaders and to approach –1 in value.

P-3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

Index: 1 – Index of Qualitative Variation for Other Attributions[17]
(+1 predictable to –1 uncertain)

> This inference is based upon the premises of information theory, where uncertainty corresponds to total variety within a set of categories and certainty corresponds to total uniformity within a set of categories. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

The strategic act of resorting to terrorist actions based on the presumption that they are the only feasible means of achieving one's political aims is directly indicative of a high degree of certainty with respect to the actions of "other." Given the risks and pressures associated with becoming a terrorist we might reasonably presume that this course of action would not be undertaken unless one was certain that less risky options would fail to alter the actions of the desired target. Ingroup bias appears yet again as a strong factor for this philosophical element in that the attribution of simplistic and predictable responses by the outgroup is expected as a form of denigration and as a means of accentuating the differentiation between in- and out- groups. Further we might well note the degree of shock and surprise that surfaces when the target actor behaves in an unforeseen manner. Crelinsten (1988) in his discussion of FLQ actions in 1970 notes the degree of surprise present amongst the Liberation Cell faction that the government never acquiesced to their demand for the liberation of prisoners. The predictability of other actions also is borne out by the generally stated policy admonition against negotiation with terrorists. Obviously this narrows the policy options of the state and thereby increases predictability. Thus in the sense of expected responses to the terrorist organization the political future is predictable. While this indicates that we should expect the value for this index to approach +1 there is little to indicate whether

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[17] "The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ration of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications." (Watson and McGraw 1980).

said value would differ distinctly from that of the mean for state leaders,[18] except that we would expect

greater diversity in the values obtained from state leaders and hence some differentiation may be seen.

P-4. How much "control" or "mastery" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

Index: Self Attributions Divided by [Self + Other Attributions]
(+1 high to –1 low self control)

> If a leader attributes more words and deeds to others, for example, then the locus of control is in others rather than in the self. The greater the leader's control over political outcomes compared to the control by others, the higher the net attributions assigned to the self. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

If there is a single point within the study of terrorism that is universally agreed upon it may be this. All

terrorist organizations believe in the ultimate inevitability of their victory. Regardless of the resource

disparity or any absence of popular support, the organization believes not only that it will triumph but

also that its members are the catalysts for change and that their operations are necessary to the eventual

achievement of success. Hoffman (1998)[19] indicates that this surety of cause, success, and role are

present in organizations of both religious and secular natures. While religious organizations tend to

ascribe their role to that of carrying out the wishes of their deity(ies), secular organizations seem to derive

this "faith" from a belief in the "innate righteousness of the cause itself." (Hoffman 1998) This "faith" in

their inevitable success also manifests itself in the requirement for actions as opposed to words and the

"burning impatience" that both Hoffman (1998) and Leites (1979) note as another hallmark of terrorists.

The presence of feelings of invulnerability and of excessive optimism are also associated with groupthink

which, as noted previously, is assumed to be highly prevalent in terrorist decision making. Together this

makes for a strongly convincing case that the belief system of a terrorist organization will reflect

exceptionally pronounced "mastery" over historical development. Thus we would expect scores

significantly higher than state leader mean and approaching the +1 value.

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[18] Note, for example, that the presence of any strongly "deterministic" ideology would likely result in a similarly high score for this index.
[19] Similar statements can be found in the works of Crenshaw, Laqueur, Post as well as several others.

P-5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Index: 1 – [Political Future x Historical Development Index]
(1.0 high role to 0.0 low role)

> [This index] is based upon the reasoning that if both the predictability of others and the leader's control over political outcomes are relatively low, then the role of chance is relatively high. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

Based the support presented for the P-3 and P-4 indexes it would seem that the role of chance would be largely absent from the terrorist belief system. The expectation is for significant differentiation from the state leaders' mean and for values to approach 0.0.

Instrumental Beliefs
I-1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

Index: % Positive minus % Negative Transitive Self Attributions
(+1= high cooperation to –1=high conflict)

> The leader's net attribution of positive (cooperative) and negative (conflictual) valences to the self indicates the answer to the first instrumental question. It represents a leader's *strategic approach to political goals* (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

All terrorists share at least some degree of emphasis on the use of violent, conflictual actions for the purpose of achieving one's strategic goals. This emphasis is axiomatic in that it is present in the vast majority of definitions of those behaviors that are classified as terrorism. That these actors are routinely engaged in the use of force or, at least, the threat of the use of force and that they perceive some strategic benefit to doing so is therefore *a priori* valid. We may presume then that the value for this index will be significantly lower than the state leader mean and may approach –1 in value.

I-2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

Index: Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3
(+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high conflict)

> Whereas strategy refers to the direction of a leader's approach to political goals, tactics refers first of all to the intensity with which the leader pursues the strategy…We assume, therefore, that the more cooperative the leader's tactics in the pursuit of goals and objectives, the greater the net *intensity* of cooperative self-attributions. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

While it is axiomatic that the defining of a group as "terrorist" implies the group's reliance upon conflict as the primary means for pursuit of their objectives, this does not indicate the intensity with which conflictual actions are prosecuted. It has become fashionable after the September 11th attacks on the United States to portray terrorist actors as, at best, ambivalent to the intensity of their actions and, at worst, actively seeking to push beyond whatever boundaries had previously existed on the scope of their actions. However there are generally perceived to be limits on the utility of conflictual actions. Hoffman (1998) makes the point that "there is nonetheless a clear appreciation both that violence has its limits and that, if used properly, it can pay vast dividends. In other words, the level of violence must be kept within the bounds of what the terrorists' 'target audience' will accept." This opinion on the terrorists' perceived utility of violent action is not universally shared. Laqueur (2003) has indicated that traditional limitations on the level of violence employed in terrorist actions are quickly fading. Modern terrorist organizations have less concrete aims and therefore also less firmly defined 'target audiences.' Their actions therefore can be less discriminate – in effect the prohibition that "Terrorists want a lot of people watching and not a lot of people dead." no longer applies to today's terrorist entities. To the extent that this disagreement may rest in the characterization of "traditional" versus "modern" terrorist organizations, the I-2 index may serve as a means of differentiation of these two classes of actors. We should expect values significantly lower than the state leader mean for both classes but values approaching –1 to be indicative of the latter class of actor.

A Word Regarding the I-1 and I-2 Indexes
The motivations for violent actions is at the heart of major divisions within the field of terrorism studies and is also played out in the differences between the I-1 and I-2 indexes. Most authors posit that violence serves an instrumental purpose, the achievement of some political goal that cannot be achieved through other means. This would seem to indicate that the use of violence would be less of a strategic approach to goals and rather more of a tactical necessity (Crenshaw 1990, Hoffman 1998, et al). If this position is correct then we ought to see a degree of moderation from the P-1 index and a relatively more extreme value for the P-2 index. However, Post (1990) and others, have argued that resorting to violent action

serves a motivational need for the terrorist and as such it is less of an instrumental means and more a strategic end. If this position is correct then the I-1 index should be significantly skewed toward the negative and we would expect an I-2 score of similar value. If, as is more likely, there are differing factors at work for various terrorist organizations than comparison of the I-1 and I-2 indexes may be a way of differentiating these types of terrorist groups from one another. Being able to identify these as separate types (as well as the potential for a mixed type) has direct policy implications for dealing with the terrorist organizations. For those organizations where violence and conflict have become their own strategic aim there will be little value in responses other than destruction of the organization itself. Further, some have argued that while violence and conflict may originate as tactical choices they can, under conditions of reinforcement that are likely present in all terrorist organizations, become goals in and of themselves. Comparison across time of these two indexes may provide a valuable link in determining whether this form of transition is occurring within a given terrorist entity.

I-3. How are the risks of political action calculated, controlled, and accepted?

Index: 1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions
(1.0 risk acceptant to 0.0 risk averse)

> The risks, that is, undesirable outcomes, associated with cooperative and conflictual actions are the risk of submission associated with a cooperative act in the pursuit of a settlement and the risk of deadlock associated with a conflictual act in the pursuit of domination. (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

Engagement in terrorist actions, even simple involvement or affiliation with such an organization entails great risk (Crenshaw 1986, 1988, 1990a, Hoffman 1998) it is therefore reasonable to presume that the belief structure of a terrorist organization would display a high degree of risk acceptance. This factor is likely to be exacerbated by the propensity for terrorist groups to operate under conditions conducive to the "risky shift" produced as a result of groupthink. Given the emphasis on violence at both the strategic and tactical levels it seems reasonable to presume that these organizations to be relatively acceptant of the risk of deadlock while significantly adverse to the risk of submission. We should expect values for the I-3 index to be higher than the state leader mean and that values close to 1.0 would be likely in the case of

groups displaying the characteristics of extreme ingroup identification and external isolation that we would associate with higher propensities for groupthink behavior.

I-4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

Index: *1 minus Absolute Value [%X - %Y Self Attributions]*
       (1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity)
       a. Cooperative versus Conflictual Tactics: X=Cooperative, Y= Conflictual
       b. Word versus Deed Tactics: X=Word, Y=Deed

> We assume that the more important the timing of action in assessing the risks of political acts, the greater the propensity to shift between conflict and cooperation…Leaders who show a low propensity to shift between words and deeds are relatively acceptant regarding the risks associated with the direction of the distribution (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

Expectations for these shift propensities are governed by the previously noted terrorist characteristics of belief in the efficacy of violence, dismissal and denigration of words as opposed to deeds, and their extreme impatience. Hoffman has characterized the terrorist mindset as one that is incapable of being content with a slow march toward their political objectives achieved perhaps through long term negotiations and compromises. Action is their watchword and as such we can expect the low shift propensity between word and deed tactics. Likewise a low shift propensity is expected for cooperative versus conflictual tactics. This expectation is further supported by factors that make violence escalation likely. Hoffman (1998) indicates that terrorists may become locked into a spiral of escalation through attempts to keep media attention focused upon themselves whether this is for the purpose of simple self-gratification, the perceived need to continually compete against other actors for media attention, or simply to overcome their perception that the media and public in general have become inured to previous levels of violence. Obviously if an organization is continually attempting to "ratchet up" the intensity of its conflictual actions this will limit its ability to shift between actions of a conflictual and cooperative nature. Therefore for both indices we expect shift propensities lower than that of the state leader mean and in circumstances that appear to demonstrate an escalation spiral values approaching 0.0 for I-4a.

I-5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

Index: Percentages for Self Attributed Exercises of Power in Categories a through f
(frequency of action type divided by total self attributed actions)
a. Reward
b. Promise
c. Appeal/Support
d. Oppose/Resist
e. Threaten
f. Punish

> We conceptualize the exercise of political power as the choice of a control relationship
> between self and other in which self seeks or maintains control of relationships with
> others by using different types of words and deeds as positive and negative sanctions.
> (Walker, Schafer and Young 1998)

Presuming that the resort to terrorist action is borne out of a disparity of resources and the terrorist belief

that other avenues of political change are closed there is a strong reason to suspect that the utility of any

means other than conflictual actions will be downplayed in the belief system of the terrorist actor.

Further, given surety of eventual success, the mere continued existence of the organization would seem to

argue for the utility of violent action. Exacerbated by the potential for escalation spiral and the presence

of a closed decision making process that tolerates little if any dissent from existing patterns of behavior,

the role assigned to non conflictual means is likely to be minimized and likewise the role of word actions

(Oppose/Resist, Threaten) will suffer in comparison to deed actions (Punish). Therefore, within each

tactical choice we would expect the conflictual choice to have a higher frequency and would also expect

that within the conflictual category the Punish choice would be more frequent than either Oppose/Resist

or Threaten and is likely to approach a frequency greater than both combined. This emphasis on negative

action should stand in stark contrast to the presumably more equitable division of frequencies expected of

state leaders indices.

Each of the five philosophical and instrumental elements that make up the operational code has been

examined above. Expected values for each of the indices have been identified and these values have been

linked to relevant theoretical literatures on terrorism. Probable areas of comparison across terrorist as

well as between terrorist and state leader operational codes were indicated where appropriate. Elements

likely to have significant relevance for contributing to both academic and policy directed investigations of terrorism were also touched upon. Testing of the above expectations for the philosophical and instrumental indices is, as noted in the original explanation of the project's line of inquiry , the next stage in this research project . Work on this aspect is proceeding but faces several methodological issues that will be briefly highlighted in a short addendum to this paper.

Conclusion

As indicated previously the purpose of this paper has been to acquaint the reader with an ongoing research project utilizing the operational code for the study of terrorist organization behaviors. The project rests upon the dual presumptions that the belief systems of terrorist actors are coherent across the decision making membership and are crucial elements to their decision making processes. Support for each of these presumptions has been provided but is in a continual process of refinement, revision, and expansion. Support is also provided for the contention that this belief system can be extracted via operational code analysis for the purposes of generating a database of operational codes of terrorist entities that is comparable across said entities as well as to non-terrorist actors. Advantages of utilizing this approach have been noted where applicable, specifically in reference to the at-a-distance nature of this data generation process. Lastly expectations for the values of the philosophical and instrumental indices were identified based upon relevant literatures on terrorism for the purpose of generating hypotheses to be tested upon completion of the operational code extraction.

APPENDIX ONE

The Operational Code - Philosophical and Instrumental Beliefs
George (1969)

Philosophical Questions

1. What is the "essential" nature of political life? Is the political universe essentially one of harmony or conflict? What is the fundamental character of one's political opponents?

2. What are the prospects for the eventual realization of one's fundamental political values and aspirations? Can one be optimistic, or must one be pessimistic on this score and in what respects the one and/or the other?

3. Is the political future predictable? In what sense and to what extent?

4. How much "control" or "master" can one have over historical development? What is one's role in "moving" and "shaping" history in the desired direction?

5. What is the role of "chance" in human affairs and in historical development?

Instrumental Questions

1. What is the best approach for selecting goals or objectives for political action?

2. How are the goals of action pursued most effectively?

3. How are the risks of political actions calculated, controlled, and accepted?

4. What is the best "timing" of action to advance one's interest?

5. What is the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests?

APPENDIX TWO

Steps in the Verbs in Context System (VICS)
(reproduced from Walker & Schafer 2000a)

1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF   OR   OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS
PAST   PRESENT   FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+)   OR   NEGATIVE (-)

WORDS	APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OR PROMISE BENEFITS (+2)	OPPOSE, RESIST (-1) OR THREATEN COSTS (-2)

DEEDS	REWARDS (+3)	PUNISHMENTS (-3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS
DOMESTIC   OR   FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

AN EXAMPLE

A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980 address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan..."

1. **Subject**: The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category**: The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain**: The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Target and Context**: The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

The **complete data line** for this statement is: other -3 foreign past afghanistan soviet-afghanistan-conflict-1979-88.

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